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Abstract—Online games and social networks are cross-
pollinating rapidly in today’s Internet: Online social network
sites are deploying more and more games in their systems,
while online game providers are leveraging social networks to
power their games. An intriguing development as it is, the
operational challenge in the previous game persists, i.e., the
large server operational cost remains a non-negligible obstacle
for deploying high-quality multi-player games. Peer-to-peer based
game network design could be a rescue, only if the game players’
mutual resource contribution has been fully incentivized and
efficiently scheduled. Exploring the unique advantage of social
network based games (social games), we advocate to utilize social
reciprocities among peers with social relationships for efficient
contribution incentivization and scheduling, so as to power a
high-quality online game with low server cost. In this paper,
social reciprocity is exploited with two give-and-take ratios at
each peer: (1) peer contribution ratio (PCR), which evaluates
the reciprocity level between a pair of social friends, and (2)
system contribution ratio (SCR), which records the give-and-take
level of the player to and from the entire network. We design
efficient peer-to-peer mechanisms for game state distribution
using the two ratios, where each player optimally decides which
other players to seek relay help from and help in relaying game
states, respectively, based on combined evaluations of their social
relationship and historical reciprocity levels. Our design achieves
effective incentives for resource contribution, load balancing
among relay peers, as well as efficient social-aware resource
scheduling. We also discuss practical implementation concerns
and implement our design in a prototype online social game.
Our extensive evaluations based on experiments on PlanetLab
verify that high-quality large-scale social games can be achieved
with conservative server costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a rapid convergence of online
game networks and social networks in the Internet. More
and more games are deployed on social network sites, e.g.,
Paintball [1] on Facebook, and Mafia Wars [2] on MySpace.
On the other hand, the online game providers are increas-
ingly leveraging social networks to power their games, from
allowing players to make their own profiles and see game
information of one another [3], to utilizing the real-world
social relationships of a player as part of the game [4].
Such a new category of games are typically referred to
as social games. Though the exact definition is still up for
debate in the industry, here we consider a social game as
a multi-player online game which enables real-world social
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connections among the players, including games on social
network sites and standalone multi-player games where social
connections exist among the players. Emerged as a promising
industry, making social games (that are successfully popular
with high-definition multimedia scenes and intensive inter-
player actions), faces a significant challenge similar to that in
traditional online games: A huge amount of server bandwidth
is expected to be provisioned, equaling to high operational
cost of the game or social network providers, e.g., enabling
a 3D massively multiplayer online game (MMOG) such as
WoW [5] on a social network website can easily cost tens of
millions of dollars per annum [6]. There have recently been
proposals advocating the peer-to-peer (P2P) technology in the
game network design [7], such that players (peers) directly
send game updates to each other, with less dependence on
the dedicated servers. Challenges remain in a peer-assisted
design, among which incentivizing sufficient and stable peer
bandwidth contribution has been a fundamental one. This
challenge is similar to that existing in other P2P applications,
but is more crucial in game update distribution given its
stringent requirement on minimizing response times.
Though there have been a number of P2P incentive designs
based on direct or indirect resource trading [8], [9], none of
them has utilized social connections among the peers. The
unique setting of a social game has made very promising a
more effective social reciprocity based incentive for P2P game
update distribution over a social network, that exploits the
natural intentionality for each peer to help socially connected
peers.
In this paper, we design a social game system which
utilizes social reciprocity to incentivize effective bandwidth
contribution and scheduling at the players, and employ peer-
assisted design to distribute game updates with low server cost.
Specifically, we target at 3D MMOG-like social games and
investigate the distribution of player updates and interactions,1
including their current locations, movements, voice conversa-
tion packets, etc.. Each player (peer) generates a “stream” of
update messages over time, and distributes it to other players
in its Area of Effect (AoE), i.e., the area that a peer’s actions
can affect [10]. A player is responsible to send its own update
stream to all other interested players in the AoE, either directly
if it has sufficient upload bandwidth, or by resorting to relay
1We assume that the game scenes (e.g., game worlds, maps) are installed
before a player joins the game (e.g., from a DVD), and do not consider their
distribution in our system.
helpers when there are too many receivers, such as the case
in popular game regions [11].
Our key design is to effectively incentivize peers with extra
upload bandwidth to serve as relay helpers in others’ stream
distribution, for which we exploit social reciprocities. We
define two light-weighted give-and-take ratios at each peer: (1)
peer contribution ratio (PCR), which evaluates the historical
reciprocity level between a pair of social friends, and (2)
system contribution ratio (SCR), that records the give-and-take
level of the player to and from the entire network. A social
reciprocity index (RI) is defined at each player to evaluate
each other peer, based on the two give-and-take ratios and the
strength of relationship between them two. This index is used
in the design of two efficient algorithms for each player to
optimally decide which other players to seek relay help from
and help in relaying game states, respectively.
Our design is able to achieve the following effectiveness: (1)
peers are maximally incentivized to contribute their available
upload resources, (2) load on different relay peers is effectively
balanced, and (3) upload bandwidth in the system is efficiently
scheduled with social awareness (or social preference), in that
players are more inclined to seek help from and help other
players with closer social ties.
We have also designed detailed practical protocols to
achieve our design, and implemented a prototype social game
system. The implementation is extensively evaluated with
experiments on PlanetLab, which validate the efficiency and
effectiveness of our design in achieving high-quality large-
scale social games with low server costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the system model and the design of two give-and-
take ratios in Sec. II. We present our detailed algorithm design
and analysis in Sec. III. We then present extensive evaluation
results based on a prototype implementation and PlanetLab
experiments in Sec. IV. Finally, we discuss related work in
Sec. V and conclude the paper in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first present the network model of our peer-assisted
social game application, define social relationships in the
system, and introduce the two give-and-take ratios designed
to exploit social reciprocity.
A. Peer-Assisted Online Game
We consider a large-scale 3D MMOG-like game, in which
players interact with each other through their controlled avatars
in a virtual world. A peer (equivalently an avatar) generates a
stream of continuous update messages during its game play,
such as those due to walking, running, talking with other peers
in the virtual world. Each peer has an AoE (Area of Effect),
which covers all other avatars and objects that this peer’s
actions can affect, and the other avatars in the AoE should
receive the update stream from the peer in a timely fashion,
in order to guarantee a fluent and seamless game experience.
A peer which generates an update stream is referred to as a
source peer or a source in short, and a peer which receives
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Fig. 1. System model of the peer-assisted avatar game.
the stream is referred to as a receiver peer or a receiver of the
stream. In our peer-assisted game design, the source peer is
responsible to distribute its update stream to all the receivers
in its AoE, as it is naturally incentivized to notify others its
own updates. The peer may directly send the update stream
to its receivers if its upload bandwidth suffices, or ask other
peers to help relay, when there are too many receivers such
that its upload bandwidth is not sufficient to serve all. These
helpers are referred to as relay helpers or relays in short. An
illustration of the game network model is given in Fig. 1,
where each circle denotes the AoE of a peer (note that the
shape of each AoE could be irregular in a game, depending
on the visibility of each avatar).
There are 𝑁 peers in the system. Let 𝑟𝑖 denote the average
bitrate of peer 𝑖’s update stream. The bitrate of update stream
varies from a source peer to another, as decided by the
interaction intensity of the avatar (e.g., fast movement and
frequent input generally lead to high bitrates); it also depends
on the type of the game, e.g., a game enabling voice chatting
among players may generate higher-bitrate update streams than
one with text messaging. Let ℛ𝑖 denote the set of receivers of
peer 𝑖’s update stream in its AoE and ℋ𝑖 be its set of at most
𝐾 candidate relay helpers, which may be distributed across
the entire game world. A relay peer may help more than one
source peer concurrently. We denote the set of source peers
requesting relay help from peer 𝑗 as 𝒮𝑗 . We assume upload
bandwidth at peers constitutes the bandwidth bottleneck, but
download bandwidth at peers is always sufficiently large.
There are a small number of dedicated servers in the system
to serve as backup relay peers, which are resorted to when a
source peer cannot find sufficient relay peers. A tracker server
keeps track of all online avatars in the system.
The aim of our design is to effectively incentivize peers
to serve as relay helpers for each other using their spare
capacity, by exploring social reciprocity among peers, as well
as to efficiently schedule upload bandwidth at peers, which
optimizes the utilization of resources in the entire system while
taking peers’ social preferences into consideration. Timely dis-
tribution of update streams with minimum server involvement
is our ultimate objective, which is especially important for a
time-critical online gaming application.
B. Social Network Model
We assume that social relationships among the players can
be organized into a social graph, where each node represents a
peer, and a bidirectional edge exists between two nodes when
the two peers are socially connected (e.g., friends, relatives,
etc.), which we refer to as social friends hereinafter. A weight
𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∈ [0, 1] is associated with each edge in the social graph,
denoting the strength of social connection between peer 𝑖
and peer 𝑗 (e.g., strength of friendship). Social relationship
is symmetric, i.e., 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑗𝑖. A larger 𝑓𝑖𝑗 represents a stronger
relationship, and 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 0 denotes no existing relationship.
Peers in the game system are supposed to have a social
preference, i.e., they wish to help their social friends more
than the other general population. We exploit social reciprocity
among players in our incentive design with respect to two
aspects: (1) direct reciprocity between two social friends, as
peers are naturally willing to help their social friends and
receive their help from time to time in return; (2) indirect
reciprocity among a peer and all other peers in the system,
where a peer contributes resources to the system expects
to receive resource contribution from others as well. Our
design will take both direct and indirect reciprocities into
consideration.
C. Two Give-and-Take Ratios
Two ratios are defined to evaluate the level of direct and
indirect reciprocities in our system.
1) Peer Contribution Ratio (PCR): Peer contribution ratio
evaluates the give-and-take balance between two social friends.
PCR 𝑊𝑗(𝑖) is defined as the ratio of peer 𝑖’s upload contribu-
tion to peer 𝑗 over the total mutual contributions between the
two:
𝑊𝑗(𝑖) = 𝐶𝑗(𝑖)/(𝐶𝑖(𝑗) + 𝐶𝑗(𝑖)).
Here, 𝐶𝑗(𝑖) is the total number of upload bytes that peer 𝑖
has historically provided for relaying peer 𝑗’s update stream,
and 𝐶𝑖(𝑗) vice versa. 𝑊𝑗(𝑖) > 12 represents that peer 𝑖 has
contributed more to peer 𝑗, and 𝑊𝑗(𝑖) < 12 vice versa.
2) System Contribution Ratio (SCR): To evaluate each
peer’s contribution in the entire system, we also define a
system contribution ratio 𝑤𝑖 as follows:
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑦
′
𝑖/(𝑦
′
𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖).
Here 𝑦′𝑖 is the total number of upload bytes peer 𝑖 has ever
provided for relaying other peers’ streams, and 𝑦𝑖 is the overall
upload bytes of resources others have provided for relaying
peer 𝑖’s stream.
The two ratios are used in our incentive design and resource
scheduling, in which peers contributing more to their social
friends receive more help from the latter, and for peers with
few social friends, providing more relay help to the general
others will receive more help in return as well. Detailed design
will be discussed in the following section.
We summarize important notations in the paper in Table I.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Symbol Definition
PCR Peer contribution ratio
SCR System contribution ratio
RI Social reciprocity index
𝑦′𝑖 The amount of upload resource peer 𝑖 has contributed to the
system
𝑦𝑖 The amount of upload resource others have provided to 𝑖
𝐶𝑖(𝑗) The amount of upload resource peer 𝑗 has provided to 𝑖
𝑤𝑖 The system contribution ratio of peer 𝑖
𝑊𝑖(𝑗) The peer contribution ratio of peer 𝑗 between the pair of peer
𝑖 and 𝑗
𝑓𝑖𝑗 The social closeness of peer 𝑖 and peer 𝑗
𝑒𝑖(𝑗) The social reciprocity index of peer 𝑗 evaluated by peer 𝑖
ℛ𝑖 The receiver set of source peer 𝑖
ℋ𝑖 The relay set of source peer 𝑖
𝒮𝑗 The source set of relay peer 𝑗
𝑢𝑖 The upload capacity of peer 𝑖
𝑟𝑖 The stream bitrate of peer 𝑖
𝑥𝑖𝑗 The number of receivers that peer 𝑖 has requested relay peer
𝑗 to help relay to
𝑎𝑗𝑖 The number of receivers that relay peer 𝑗 has accepted to relay
for peer 𝑖
𝐿 The number of candidate relay peers provided by the tracker
server
𝐾 The maximum number of relay peers a source maintains
𝑇ℎ The duration of a time slot
III. DETAILED DESIGN: CONTRIBUTION
INCENTIVIZATION AND RESOURCE SCHEDULING
We now present our detailed incentive design for relay
resource contribution, through a social reciprocity index that
we define, and efficient strategies that relay peers apply to
schedule their resources.
A. Social Reciprocity Index (RI)
We design a social reciprocity index 𝑒𝑖(𝑗) for each peer 𝑖
to evaluate its perceived contribution level from another peer
𝑗, based on the two give-and-take ratios and the strength of
social relationship between them two, as follows:
𝑒𝑖(𝑗) = (1− 𝑓𝑖𝑗)𝑤𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑖(𝑗).
The rationale of this index is as follows: If peer 𝑗 has
a stronger social relationship (i.e., large 𝑓𝑖𝑗) with peer 𝑖, 𝑖
evaluates 𝑗 more based on relay help 𝑗 has provided to itself
(i.e., 𝑊𝑖(𝑗)). If little social relationship exists between peer
𝑖 and peer 𝑗 (i.e., small 𝑓𝑖𝑗), 𝑖 evaluates 𝑗 more according
to relative contributions 𝑗 has made to the entire system (i.e.,
𝑤𝑗).
This index is used in two effective strategies for each source
to choose which other peers to seek relay help from, and for
each relay to optimally decide which source peers to help,
respectively. Specifically, each source will choose peers with
smaller RI values it evaluates as relay helpers, and each relay
tends to help sources with larger RI values it has evaluated.
The idea is four-fold: (1) A source peer 𝑖 prefers requesting
relay help from social friends which it has helped a lot
historically (i.e., smaller 𝑊𝑖(𝑗)), or from other peers whose
contribution level to the entire system is low (i.e., smaller 𝑤𝑗);
(2) A relay peer 𝑗 favors helping its social friends which it
has received a lot of help from historically (i.e., larger 𝑊𝑗(𝑖)),
or other peers whose contribution level to the entire system is
high (i.e., larger 𝑤𝑖); (3) Social friends exchange relay help
more according to the level of direct reciprocity evaluated
by PCRs; (4) Peers with little social connections contribute
relay resources among each other more according to SCRs,
enabling multilateral reciprocity in the entire system. Detailed
algorithms and rationale discussions follow in the next two
sub sections.
B. Source Peer’s Algorithm: Selecting Relay Helpers
When the number of receivers in the AoE of source peer 𝑖
exceeds its upload capacity, 𝑖 seeks relay helpers. Especially,
three steps are involved: (1) source 𝑖 chooses relays among a
candidate set ℋ𝑖, which contains potential relay helpers with
spare upload bandwidth that 𝑖 has acquired from the tracker
server, 2 (2) estimates how many receivers each selected relay
peer may possibly help with, and then (3) assigns specific
receivers to each selected relay peer.
1) Choosing Relays: Source peer 𝑖 ranks all relay candi-
dates in ℋ𝑖 in ascending order of their RIs 𝑒𝑖(𝑗), ∀𝑗 ∈ ℋ𝑖,
and chooses peers to request relay from in this order. In this
way, as discussed in Sec. III-A, source 𝑖 prefers social friends
which it has helped a lot and asked little, or other peers which
have contributed less to the system but taken more. The reason
lies in that those peers are more likely to agree to help the
source in relaying update streams, according to the decision
algorithm to be discussed in Sec. III-C, in order to regain their
give-and-take balance.
In addition, when ties occur, candidates which are also
receivers in the AoE of the source peer are prioritized, as they
themselves expect to receive the update stream and fewer extra
relay helpers will result.
2) Estimating Relay’s Available Upload Bandwidth: Each
candidate relay peer, which has spare bandwidth besides send-
ing its own game updates to its receivers, may potentially help
multiple other source peers. To decide how many receivers a
relay may forward source 𝑖’s stream to, 𝑖 carries out a probing
algorithm: For new relay peer 𝑗, 𝑖 randomly decides an initial
number of receivers, 𝑥(0)𝑖𝑗 , to relay 𝑗. In each following round
𝑇 , if the receivers assigned to relay 𝑗 have all received 𝑖’s
stream via 𝑗 in 𝑇 −1, 𝑖 will try to assign one more receiver to
relay 𝑗; otherwise, if only 𝑎(𝑇−1)𝑗𝑖 receivers (𝑎(𝑇−1)𝑗𝑖 < 𝑥(𝑇−1)𝑖𝑗 )
are served, 𝑖 will adjust 𝑥(𝑇−1)𝑖𝑗 to 𝑎(𝑇−1)𝑗𝑖 , i.e.,
𝑥
(𝑇 )
𝑖𝑗 =
{
𝑥
(𝑇−1)
𝑖𝑗 + 1, if 𝑎
(𝑇−1)
𝑗𝑖 = 𝑥
(𝑇−1)
𝑖𝑗 ,
𝑎
(𝑇−1)
𝑗𝑖 , if 𝑎
(𝑇−1)
𝑗𝑖 < 𝑥
(𝑇−1)
𝑖𝑗 ,
𝑇 = 1, 2, . . .
Since a source peer only maintains at most 𝐾 relay candi-
dates, the ones with smallest estimate relay capacities will be
2Implementation details on how a source peer learns about receivers and
candidate relay peers will be discussed in Sec. III-D.
eliminated from ℋ𝑖.
3) Assigning Receivers to Relays: We consider three dif-
ferent methods for sources to decide which receivers itself
uploads to and which others to be served via relays, that
require different levels of network delay information: (1)
Random assignment. The receivers source 𝑖 directly sends
streams to and the 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 receivers to be served by relay 𝑗
are randomly assigned by source 𝑖 from all its receivers. No
information about delay is needed. (2) RTT-to-source based
assignment. If source 𝑖 has measured its round-trip-times
(RTTs) with each receiver, receivers with the largest RTTs
are assigned to relay peers randomly, with the hope that the
latency for them to receive the updates can be reduced by such
detouring. This is based on the observation by Ly et al. that
detouring paths can reduce delays as compared to those along
original long paths [12]. (3) Enhanced RTT-to-source based
assignment. If source 𝑖 is further able to learn the RTT to each
relay and the RTT between each receiver and each relay (e.g.
by referring to a network coordinate system [13]), it assigns
a receiver with large direct RTT to itself to a relay, such that
the smallest end-to-end latency results. We will evaluate the
performance in cases of different strategies in Sec. IV.
Our design considers only one-hop relay of update streams,
i.e., a relay peer receives the stream from the source peer
and then forwards to receivers directly, since more relay hops
may well add to delay and complexity of the game state
distribution. In the case that the aggregate upload bandwidth
of source 𝑖 and all its relay peers is not enough to distribute
the stream at rate 𝑟𝑖 to all receivers, servers are resorted to
serve as relays.
The algorithm carried out by each source peer is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1. At source peer 𝑖, 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 is
called periodically. In line 01 − 02, the stream is delivered
to all receivers by source 𝑖 directly if its upload capacity
suffices. Otherwise, it resorts to the relay peers, by selecting
the relay helpers that have minimum RIs (line 04), and
assigning the number of receivers according to their upload
capacity (line 08− 09), which is estimated using the probing
strategy discussed. Notice that source 𝑖 never waits for upload
notification from relay peers, since the upload capacities
(𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑇 )) are updated by upload allocation (𝑎(𝑇−1)𝑗𝑖 ) in the
previous round. When the source peer is able to address the
remaining receivers, it will stop requesting relay peers (line
07); and source peer 𝑖 reserves one slot of its upload capacity
(equal to its streaming rate 𝑟𝑖), so that it can send its updates
to the server for relaying when capacities from relay peers are
not enough (line 07, 14, 15).
C. Relay Peer’s Algorithm: Scheduling Upload Contribution
When a player has extra upload bandwidth (beyond that
used for distributing its own update streams), it may register
itself as a candidate relay with the tracker server, and may take
itself down from the candidate list when its upload bandwidth
is fully used. The voluntary helper registration is incentivized
by our upload scheduling algorithm, to be discussed next.
Algorithm 1 Source Peer’s Algorithm
procedure StreamSchedule()
01: if 𝑢𝑖 ≥ ∣ℛ𝑖∣𝑟𝑖, then
02: 𝑖 will distribute the stream to all receivers directly
03: else
04: Sort ℋ𝑖 in ascending order of RIs (𝑒𝑖(𝑗)’s), and a
relay peer that is also a receiver is prioritized
05: 𝑢 = 𝑢𝑖, 𝑣 = ∣ℛ𝑖∣
06: for each relay peer 𝑗 in sorted list ℋ𝑖
07: if 𝑢 < 2𝑟𝑖 or ⌊𝑢/𝑟𝑖⌋ ≥ 𝑣 then break
08: 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥
(𝑇−1)
𝑖𝑗 + 1, if 𝑎
(𝑇−1)
𝑗𝑖 = 𝑥
(𝑇−1)
𝑖𝑗 ;
otherwise 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎
(𝑇−1)
𝑗𝑖
09: Select 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 receivers from ℛ𝑖 according to
assignment method
10: Send to relay 𝑗 the update stream together with
the list of assigned receivers
11: 𝑣 = 𝑣 − 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗
12: if 𝑗 /∈ ℛ𝑖, then 𝑢 = 𝑢− 𝑟𝑖
13: end for
14: Send the stream to remaining receivers one by one
until 𝑖’s remaining upload bandwidth is smaller than
2𝑟𝑖
15: Resort to the server for relaying to all remaining
receivers
16: end if
The tracker server may provide each candidate relay peer
to multiple source peers, and therefore each candidate relay
can receive multiple requests from different sources simulta-
neously. When relay peer 𝑗’s spare upload bandwidth is not
enough to serve all the receivers specified in the requests, it
chooses the source peers to help, prioritizing those with large
social reciprocity indices (𝑒𝑗(𝑖)’s) it evaluates. Specifically, a
relay periodically decides the source peers it helps in each
time slot 𝑇 , among the set of source peers 𝒮𝑗 , which request
relay help from itself. On the other hand, once a source peer 𝑖
is chosen, it is guaranteed that relay 𝑗 will forward 𝑖’s update
stream for the duration of the time slot (𝑇ℎ seconds), in order
to avoid inefficiency caused by frequent relay switches.
Let 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 denote the number of receivers that relay 𝑗 is
to serve for source peer 𝑖 in time slot 𝑇 . Recall that 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗
is the number of receivers source 𝑖 asks relay 𝑗 to serve.
𝑢𝑗 is the maximum upload bandwidth of peer 𝑗. The source
selection and upload scheduling problem is formulated into
the following optimization problem:
max
∑
𝑖∈𝒮𝑗
𝑒𝑗(𝑖)𝑎
(𝑇 )
𝑗𝑖
subject to:
𝑎
(𝑇 )
𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝑗 ,∑
𝑖∈𝒮𝑗
𝑎
(𝑇 )
𝑗𝑖 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑗 − ∣ℛ𝑗 ∣𝑟𝑗 − 2𝑟𝑗 ,
𝑎
(𝑇 )
𝑗𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝑗 .
Algorithm 2 Relay Peer’s Algorithm
procedure AllocateUpload()
01: 𝑢 = 𝑢𝑗 − ∣ℛ𝑗 ∣𝑟𝑗 − 2𝑟𝑗
02: Sort peers in 𝒮𝑗 in descending order of RIs (𝑒𝑗(𝑖)’s)
03: for each source peer 𝑖 in sorted list 𝒮𝑗
04: 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 = min{⌊𝑢/𝑟𝑖⌋, 𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 }
05: 𝑢 = 𝑢− 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 𝑟𝑖
06: end for
07: Send upload allocation 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 to source peer 𝑖, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝑗
08: On receiving stream from source peer 𝑖, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝑗 ,
forward the stream to indicated receivers
To solve this integer linear program for 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 ’s, we design the
following heuristic: Relay peer 𝑗 first allocates upload capacity
of ∣ℛ𝑗 ∣𝑟𝑗 − 2𝑟𝑗 for its own stream distribution, where 2 slots
are reserved for new receivers. Then 𝑗 maximally allocates its
spare upload bandwidth (𝑢𝑗−∣ℛ𝑗 ∣𝑟𝑗−2𝑟𝑗) to source peers (𝑖’s)
in descending order of their social reciprocity indices (𝑒𝑗(𝑖)’s),
according to the number of receivers each source has asked
𝑗 to forward streams to (𝑥(𝑇 )𝑖𝑗 ), until its upload bandwidth
becomes insufficient to forward a whole stream. In this way,
social friends which have helped 𝑗 a lot previously, or others
which have contributed significantly to the entire system, will
be given higher priority.
The algorithm carried out by each relay peer is summarized
in Algorithm 2, which is invoked at the beginning of each
time slot 𝑇 . In line 01, the relay determines its spare upload
capacity, and then allocates it to source peers according to
their RIs. In our design, the relay peer reserves 2𝑟𝑗 upload
capacity for itself, in case that new receiver peers may be
discovered during the time slot. After that, the relay peer sends
the upload allocation notification 𝑎𝑖𝑗 to all source peers in 𝒮𝑗
(line 07), and the latter will adjust their receiver assignment as
discussed in the source peer’s algorithm. On receiving streams
from source peers, the relay peer will forward the streams to
the receivers (line 08).
We note that source peers are allocated relay resources
according to how much help they have provided historically,
as captured in 𝑒𝑗(𝑖). This incentivizes a peer with spare
upload resource to contribute relay help (by registering with
the tracker server), such that when it needs relay help for
distributing its own updates, its social reciprocity indices can
rank high at other peers, and it can easily receive relay help
in return. More discussions on effectiveness of our design will
be given in Sec. III-E.
D. Implementation Discussions
We next discuss key implementation issues of our design in
practice.
1) Maintenance of Give-and-Take Ratios: The amount of
resources a peer 𝑖 has contributed to/taken from its social
friends and the entire system, i.e., 𝐶𝑗(𝑖)’s, 𝐶𝑖(𝑗)’s, 𝑦′𝑖, and
𝑦𝑖, are recorded since peer 𝑖 registered an account with the
online game system. In our implementation, mutual resource
contributions between peer 𝑖 and peer 𝑗 (𝐶𝑗(𝑖) and 𝐶𝑖(𝑗)) are
maintained at both 𝑖 and 𝑗, while system contributions of each
peer 𝑖 (𝑦′𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖) are maintained by the tracker server, similar
to that in the existing private P2P file sharing systems [14]. In
particular, after relay 𝑗 helps source 𝑖 in serving 𝑎𝑗𝑖 receivers
for Δ𝑡 seconds, 𝐶𝑖(𝑗) maintained at both peer 𝑖 and peer 𝑗
will be increased by the total number of upload bytes 𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑟𝑖Δ𝑡,
while 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦′𝑗 maintained at the tracker server will be
increased by 𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑟𝑖Δ𝑡 as well.
2) Receiver and Relay Discovery: In our design, a source
peer actively discovers its receiver peers and relay helpers.
For receiver discovery, the virtual world is divided into small
regions, whose size is at the same magnitude as players’ AoEs.
Each peer periodically reports its current location to the tracker
server. A source peer learns about receivers in its AoE via the
tracker server.
When a source peer needs (more) relay peers, it contacts the
tracker server, which will provide 𝐿 peers randomly selected
from its candidate relay pool. In our implementation, a peer
𝑗 with extra upload capacity (?˜?𝑗 = 𝑢𝑗 − ∣ℛ𝑗 ∣𝑟𝑗 ≥ 2𝑟𝑗) may
register as a relay helper. When its extra upload capacity is
below 2𝑟𝑗 , it will no longer serve as relay helpers. At the
source peer, it keeps the size of relay helper set ℋ𝑖 no larger
than the maximum relay number of 𝐾, and candidate relay
peers with the smallest upload allocation to 𝑖 will be eliminated
when new relay peers are discovered from the tracker.
3) Relay Durations: We have designed that a relay 𝑗 will
serve a receiver for at least the duration of one time slot,
i.e., 𝑇ℎ seconds. During each time slot, new relay requests
from source peers may arrive from time to time, which will
be inserted into set 𝒮𝑗 ; peer 𝑗 will decide its new upload
bandwidth allocation at the beginning of the next time slot. The
choice of 𝑇ℎ renders a tradeoff: small 𝑇ℎ may lead to frequent
relay switches for source peers, while large 𝑇ℎ may result in
less efficient utilization of relay peers’ upload bandwidth, as
relay requests from source peers with high priority may not
be timely addressed. We will evaluate the effects of different
𝑇ℎ values in our experiments.
Note that although we have introduced “rounds” at peers for
execution of source and relay algorithms, our system operates
in a fully asynchronous fashion: individual peers carry out the
designed protocols periodically, while rounds at different peers
do not need to be synchronized at all.
E. Analysis of Design Effectiveness
We analyze our design, and show that it achieves the three
objectives listed in the introduction, namely peers’ maximal
upload contribution, load balancing among relays, and efficient
upload bandwidth scheduling with preference towards close
social ties.
1) Incentives for Upload Contribution: In our design, relay
peers allocate their upload bandwidth to requesting source
peers in descending order of their social reciprocity indices
(RIs) that it calculates. The more help source peer 𝑖 has
provided to relay peer 𝑗 or to the entire system, the larger
RI (𝑒𝑗(𝑖)) 𝑗 will evaluate towards 𝑖, and the more likely 𝑗
will help 𝑖 in relaying its update streams. Source peer 𝑖 does
not have information about RIs that relay 𝑗 evaluates towards
other requesting sources, and has no idea whether its own RI
is large enough to be selected by 𝑗. Therefore, peer 𝑖 has to
always keep its RI at a high level, by maximally serving all
its own receivers directly (to prevent decrease of RIs due to
seeking relay help), and by contributing spare upload resource
whenever there is, in order to enhance its system contribution
ratio and peer contribution ratios to others (to boost increase of
its RIs). Consequently, our design effectively incentives upload
bandwidth contributions at all peers in the game system. Since
some peers may have quite small RIs due to their low upload
capacities, it could be difficult for them to obtain enough relay
help. A promising approach is that these peers can buy extra
game “points” from the game provider or operator, and pay
the server or other peers to relay updates for them. We will
address this mechanism in future work.
2) Load Balancing at Relays: In source peer’s algorithm in
Sec. III-B1, a source peer 𝑖 chooses relays from all candidates
in ascending order of their RIs, 𝑒𝑖(𝑗) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗) 𝑦
′
𝑗
𝑦′𝑗+𝑦𝑗
+
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑖(𝑗)
𝐶𝑗(𝑖)+𝐶𝑖(𝑗)
, ∀𝑗 ∈ ℋ𝑖. Relays with smaller RIs, i.e., which
source 𝑖 has helped a lot but asked little from, or that have
contributed less to the system but taken more from, are more
likely to be chosen. If relay 𝑗 is chosen and forwards 𝑖’s
streams, 𝑦′𝑗 and 𝐶𝑖(𝑗) will increase, then 𝑒𝑖(𝑗) will increase,
and peer 𝑗’s rank lowers in source 𝑖’s relay selection. In the
next round, relay 𝑗 may not be selected by source 𝑖 — other
candidate relays with smaller contributions will be chosen —
until its contribution level becomes relatively low again. In this
way, our scheme enables balanced resource utilization at all
peers, by always having source peers use relays with historical
lowest contribution levels.
3) Social Preference: Besides historical contributions, so-
cial closeness 𝑓𝑖𝑗 between peers is also considered in evalu-
ating RIs. In relay peer’s algorithm in Sec. III-C, a relay peer
𝑗 decides sources to help according to descending order of
their RIs, 𝑒𝑗(𝑖) = (1− 𝑓𝑖𝑗) 𝑦
′
𝑖
𝑦′𝑖+𝑦𝑖
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑗(𝑖)
𝐶𝑖(𝑗)+𝐶𝑗(𝑖)
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝑗 . A
source 𝑖 with closer social relationship (larger 𝑓𝑖𝑗) and more
historical contribution to 𝑗 (larger 𝐶𝑗(𝑖)𝐶𝑖(𝑗) ) is more likely to
derive a larger 𝑒𝑗(𝑖) and thus has higher priority to be chosen
by relay 𝑗. Therefore, mutual relay help between peers with
close social ties is facilitated, while upload bandwidth in the
entire system is efficiently scheduled.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of our design based on a pro-
totype implementation of a social game system and extensive
experiments on PlanetLab.
A. Prototype Implementation and Experimental Settings
We implement a prototype multi-player game in C++ pro-
gramming language, where avatars interact and move around
in a virtual world. The world is divided into 15× 15 regions,
each of which is of size 40 × 40. 240 PlanetLab nodes are
used in our experiments, corresponding to the total number
of avatars. Avatars are distributed initially across the game
regions following a zipf distribution.
The mobility pattern of each avatar is as follows: an avatar
moves across these regions, and stays in one region for a short
period. The time an avatar spends in a particular region is
proportional to the region’s popularity, which varies from 1
second to 300 seconds; when an avatar moves, its moving
speed is randomly chosen from the range of [5, 8]; and the
probability that it moves towards a specific direction (i.e., a
specific adjacent region) is proportional to the popularity of
that adjacent region. Avatars do not move back to the same
region within 10 seconds. The radius of an avatar’s AoE is
20. Each avatar is generating a stream of update packets at
the rate of 80Kbps. Each packet for update stream has the
size of 1KB. We limit the upload bandwidth of the peers
(download bandwidth is never the bottleneck), such that 20%
of the nodes have an upload capacity of 512Kbps, 60% have
upload bandwidth of 1Mbps, and the rest 20% are 2Mbps.
In our prototype system, there is a tracker server, helping
each source peer find receivers and relays. There is also a
dedicated server to serve as a backup relay. In our default
settings, the number of candidate relay peers supplied by the
tracker server per inquiry, 𝐿, is 20, time slot duration 𝑇ℎ is
3 seconds, and the maximum number of relay candidates per
source, 𝐾, is 10. Packets of update streams and other control
messages are delivered over UDP. Each packet is stamped with
the time 𝑡1 when it is sent out from the source, and also
the time 𝑡2 when it is received by the receiver. In order to
derive the end-to-end delay 𝑡2 − 𝑡1 of packet distribution, we
synchronize clocks at all nodes (but note that synchronization
is not needed for carrying out our algorithms). Each of our
experiments lasts about 40 minutes.
Social closeness 𝑓𝑖𝑗 between peers are set following a
distribution summarized based on a set of runtime traces from
Renren [15], one of the largest online social network sites in
China. The traces we obtained from Renren operators contain
information of more than 10, 000 users and their friend lists.
We derive the social closeness 𝑓𝑖𝑗 between peer 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the
following intuitive fashion: We suppose peers sharing more
common friends have closer relationship than those with fewer
common friends, and evaluate 𝑓𝑖𝑗 as the fraction of common
friends of peer 𝑖 and 𝑗, 𝑓𝑖𝑗 = ∣𝐹𝑖∩𝐹𝑗 ∣∣𝐹𝑖∪𝐹𝑗 ∣ , where 𝐹𝑖 denotes the
set of friends of peer 𝑖.
B. Effectiveness of Contribution Incentivization
We investigate the effectiveness of our incentives by evaluat-
ing a success ratio of relay requests, issued by different source
peers. In our design, the relay request sent from a source peer
to a relay may not be served, as relays carry out a source
selection algorithm when its spare upload bandwidth cannot
serve all the relay requests. If a relay request is not served,
the source has to request relay help again from another relay,
which introduces additional delay into its stream distribution.
Therefore, the request success ratio of a source peer 𝑖, defined
as the fraction of the number of its relay requests that are
fully served by corresponding relays (i.e., at relays 𝑗 ∈ ℋ𝑖
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where 𝑎(𝑇 )𝑗𝑖 = 𝑥
(𝑇 )
𝑖𝑗 ), over the total number of relay requests it
has issued over time, can be used to represent distribution
efficiency of a peer’s update stream. Fig. 2 illustrates the
request success ratios of source peers against their respective
average upload bandwidth contributed for relaying others’
streams over the duration of the experiment. Each sample in
the figure represents one peer in the system. We observe that
peers with higher upload contribution can obtain larger request
success ratio when they need relay help to distribute their own
update streams. In this way, peers are incentivized to contribute
more upload bandwidth according to our design.
C. Load Balancing on Peers
We first study mutual relay help between peer pairs. We
compare our design with a simple random scheduling scheme,
in which source peers randomly select relays from its candi-
date pool and relay peers randomly choose sources to help,
respectively. Fig. 3 plots the overall number of bytes peer 𝑖
has helped relay for peer 𝑗 against the total number of bytes
peer 𝑗 has uploaded for relaying peer 𝑖’s stream throughout
the duration of the experiment, for all pairs of peers in the
system. Each sample in the figure represents one peer pair.
We observe that mutual resource contribution between two
peers is much more balanced with our design than that in the
random scheduling scheme.
Fig. 4 illustrates the load of relay requests at each relay peer
against its system contribution ratio. The load of relay requests
is calculated as the number of requests received by each relay
peer in the last 5 minutes, against the system contribution ratio
at the beginning of this period. Each sample represents one
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relay peer. Relay peers with larger SCRs (more contribution to
the system) receive less requests than peers with smaller SCRs
(less contribution to the system), validating the effectiveness
of load balancing among relay peers with our design.
D. Social Preference
Fig. 5 investigates the impact of social closeness between
sources and relays on the upload resource allocation at the
relays. We categorize source-relay pairs according to the social
closeness between the two (i.e., 𝑓𝑖𝑗), and count in each
category the number of packets each relay has forwarded
for the corresponding source throughout the duration of the
experiment. This number is further divided by the number of
source-relay pairs in each category to generate the number of
packets relayed per source-relay pair, and plotted against the
social closeness level of the category in a cumulative function
fashion in Fig. 5. We can observe that our design achieves
better social preference, in that relay help is exchanged more
between social friends than that in the random scheduling
scheme. The reason lies in that a pair of social friends may
provide relay help to each other for many times throughout
their game play, according to the source and relay selection
strategies in our design.
To further illustrate social preference achieved by our de-
sign, we divide all pairs of peers into 5 groups according to
their social closeness range, and calculate the average request
success ratio (defined in Sec. IV-B) between peer pairs in
each group, and plot the results in Fig. 6. The results again
show that our design achieves better social preference than
the random scheduling scheme, in that the average request
success ratio is larger when social ties between peer pairs
are stronger with our design, while it does not change much
with the variation of social closeness levels in the random
scheduling scheme.
E. Stream Distribution Delay
We evaluate the average stream distribution delay at each
source peer, calculated as the average end-to-end latency
for each of its update packets to be delivered from the
source to the receivers. Fig. 7 compares the average end-to-
end stream distribution delay among all source peers, when
different receiver-to-relay assignment strategies are applied,
as discussed in Sec. III-B3. As expected, the enhanced RTT-
to-source algorithm leads to the lowest stream distribution
latency, when information of RTTs between peers is available.
Otherwise, random assignment achieves similar delay perfor-
mance to the RTT-to-source based assignment, while incurring
less RTT measurement overhead. In our other experiments, we
have used random assignment for receiver-to-relay mappings
as the default.
F. Server Load and Protocol Overhead
In Fig. 8 and 9, we study the relay load on dedicated servers
and the protocol overhead in our system, in terms of different
maximum number of relays each source maintains, 𝐾, and
the length of a time slot, 𝑇ℎ. The server load is defined as the
fraction of update packets that are relayed by the server over
all packets distributed in the system throughout the duration
of the experiment. The overhead in our algorithms includes
control messages sent by source peers to discover receivers and
relays, and those used by relay peers to register with the tracker
server and allocate its upload bandwidth, etc. We evaluate the
control overhead using the ratio of the total number of bytes
in control messages over the total number of bytes of game
updates distributed in the system.
In Fig. 8, we can see that if 𝑇ℎ is too large or too small,
server load is higher. The reason is that for larger 𝑇ℎ, more
relay resource is wasted as being locked for a source peer
which no longer needs it. While for smaller 𝑇ℎ, the relay needs
to reschedule the requests to serve frequently. With respect to
control overhead, Fig. 9 shows that smaller 𝑇ℎ leads to larger
overhead, since more control messages are sent among relay
peers and source peers for relay scheduling.
On the other hand, we observe that a larger 𝐾 leads to
lower server load, since source peers can select among a larger
set of relay candidates, and their requests are more likely
to be fully served. However, larger 𝐾 also leads to higher
control overhead, since more messages are sent to maintain
these many relays at each source peer.
Based on these observations, we have used the default
values of 𝑇ℎ = 3 seconds and 𝐾 = 10 in our other
experiments, which achieve a good tradeoff between server
load reduction and control overhead.
The above results also show that the bandwidth needed
to send control messages for maintaining our P2P system is
quite low, as compared to the streaming bandwidth demand.
In addition, the load on dedicated servers can been signifi-
cantly alleviated by using our P2P incentive mechanism, to
implement a high-quality social game system.
V. RELATED WORK
Incentive engineering has been an important issue of P2P
networks since its inception [16]. Different strategies have
been designed to encourage peers’ mutual sharing of upload
resources, e.g., tit-for-tat used in Bittorrent [17], reputation
systems [18], and other game-theoretical approaches [19].
Recently, Liu et al. [20] have observed that better sharing
performance can be achieved in some private P2P file sharing
systems, by applying an admission control mechanism based
on upload/download ratio of each peer.
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A few recent studies have explored social connections
among nodes for better content distribution in a network.
Pouwelse et al. [21] design a social network based file sharing
system, which enables fast content discovery and recommen-
dation. Liu et al. [22] design a network-wide tit-for-tat scheme,
where peers can trade resources via a social chain in a P2P
network. Li et al. [23] enable social preference during message
routing in a delay tolerant network, where nodes are more
likely to route messages for those with social relationships.
Peer-assisted online game design has been proposed in
recent years. Pittman et al. [24] have measured the popular-
ities of regions in the virtual world in the MMOGs, which
are shown to follow a power-low distribution. Bharambe et
al. [25] propose Donnybrook, a system that enables First-
Person Shooter (FPS) games without dedicated server re-
sources. Varvello et al. [7] design and evaluate a P2P com-
munication infrastructure to distribute the management of the
virtual world in Second Life, based on the structured P2P
network Kad. Hu et al. [26] propose FLoD, in which the
3D contents in the virtual environment are delivered as media
streams by peers.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper advocates to utilize social reciprocities among
peers for efficient contribution incentivization and scheduling,
in order to power high-quality online games with low server
cost. We exploit social reciprocity with two light-weighted
give-and-take ratios at each peer, which record peer’s contri-
butions to social friends and to the entire system, respectively.
We also design efficient peer-to-peer mechanisms for game
state distribution based on a combination of peers’ social re-
lationship and historical contribution levels. Through analysis
and extensive experiments using a prototype implementation
on PlanetLab, we show that our design is able to achieve
effective incentives for resource contribution, load balancing
among relay peers, as well as efficient social-aware resource
scheduling. All these verify that high-quality large-scale social
games can be achieved based on our design. For future work,
we are going to evaluate our strategy in more realistic games,
and design mechanisms to avoid attacks such as cheating of
peers.
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